



The Politics of EU Enlargement Revisited - What conditions matter in the case of the EU's South-Eastern enlargement?

Research Article

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The Politics of EU Enlargement Revisited - What conditions matter in the case of the EU's South-Eastern enlargement?

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There are considerable variations in the pace and speed of EU's South-Eastern enlargement. Bulgaria and Romania joined European Union (EU) in 2007, Croatia became the 28th member-state only in July 2013 while the rest of the South-East European (SEE) countries are facing uncertainty about the time they will join the Union. The article revisits the previous debate on EU enlargement politics with the aim to uncover necessary and sufficient conditions that matter in the case of EU enlargement in South-East Europe. Our qualitative comparative analysis shows that having a liberal democracy as well as pro-enlargement EU member-states are both necessary conditions, if joined with the applicant's achievement of the condition of a functional market economy and effective administrative capacities, can sufficiently derive into EU accession.

Keywords: EU Enlargement, Southeastern Europe, QCA

Introduction

The study of EU enlargement gained impetus especially after the end of the Cold War when EU enlargement policy was established as a permanent policy on the EU's agenda.¹ Most of the enlargement literature² theoretically builds upon and empirically focuses on the applicant states of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) or the countries of the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA).³ The few efforts theo-

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¹ Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2005b. *Liberal Community and Enlargement: an Event History Analysis*, in *The Politics of European Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches*, edited by Schimmelfennig, Frank and Ulrich Sedelmeier. New York: Routledge, 172-97.

² Note that there are two main stages of research regarding EU integration of the potential candidate countries. The first one regards the politics of EU enlargement, analyzing the process leading to enlargement, while a further aspect regards the impact of enlargement, analyzing the effects/impact the process of enlargement brings about. See Schimmelfennig, Frank and Ulrich Sedelmeier. 2002. Theorizing EU enlargement: Research Focus, Hypotheses, and the State of Research. *Journal of European Public Policy* 9(4), 504-7. The latter associates with Europeanization literature where there has been an abundant literature focusing on EU conditionality and its impact on the candidate countries (e.g. Schimmelfennig, Frank and Ulrich Sedelmeier. 2005. *The politics of EU enlargement: Theoretical and Comparative Perspectives*, in *The Politics of European Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches*, edited by Schimmelfennig, Frank and Ulrich Sedelmeier. New York: Routledge, 3-25).

³ Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, *Theorizing EU Enlargement*; Sjursen, Helene. 2002. Why Expand?: The Question of Legitimacy and Justification in the EU's Enlargement Policy. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40(3), 491-513.

rising EU enlargement seek to explain why and how EU enlargement takes place. The key theoretical question that these studies address is why and under what conditions the EU decided to enlarge eastward. Yet, more comparison among different waves of EU enlargement rounds is needed.⁴ Acknowledging CEE and EFTA's short time period of accession and speaking only about the reasons and motivations of *why* EU enlargement happens, is insufficient to make us understand *when* accession occurs.

Studying EU enlargement process of the new candidate countries from the South-East Europe (SEE) is a good empirical case to answer the latter and focus on the factors influencing the enlargement decision-making process, since the puzzle of enlarging South-East has become a question of *when* accession will happen rather than *if* EU will enlarge South-East at all.⁵ Unlike the CEEC and EFTA countries, the South-East European countries differ much on the degree and type of contractual relation with EU. They are being considered to progress towards EU integration on an individual level, differently from the CEECs who start association/accession negotiations 'en block'.⁶ Of all South-East European countries, Bulgaria and Romania succeeded in joining the EU in 2007 while Croatia became the 28th EU member-state only in July 2013. The rest of the SEE countries, regardless of their membership prospects, differ much on the stages of EU integration and what is more important they are facing uncertainty about the time they will join the Union. Despite being considered potential member-states, not all of them have yet received the candidate status or opened accession negotiations, e.g. Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Albania. Furthermore, even within a modality they still present differences in the speed of enlargement process, e.g. Macedonia a candidate country since 2005 has not yet started accession negotiations.

In this article we try to explain the variation in the speed of EU enlargement and search for conditions that matter in the EU's enlargement decisions to further progress with accession of the SEE candidate countries. If complying with EU requirements and norms is a necessary condition for accession, is it sufficient enough to lead into EU accession? If not, what additional key EU inner conditions would sufficiently bring about EU enlargement?

In order to address these research questions we use qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). Research on the factors determining enlargement decisions have been predominantly single case studies with a few exceptions of larger statistical analysis.⁷ Thus, QCA application and strengths have yet to be appreciated since it is a method that bridges the qualitative-quantitative divide. QCA tries to identify possible lawful

⁴ Wallace, Helen. 2005. *Enlarging the European Union: Reflections on the challenge of analysis*, in *The Politics of European Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches*, edited by Schimmelfennig, Frank and Ulrich Sedelmeier. New York: Routledge, 297-94

⁵ Jano, Dorian. 2009. The *Whys* and *When* Enlarging to the Western Balkans. *European Journal of Economic and Political Studies* 2(1), 61-77.

⁶ The first CEECs countries (Cyprus also started in the same year) that start accession negotiations in 1998 where Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia. The rest of the countries (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia - Malta was also included) started accession negotiations in 2000.

⁷ See Schimmelfennig, *Liberal Community*; Mattli, Walter and Thomas Plümpner. 2005. *The demand-side politics of EU Enlargement: Democracy and the application for EU membership*, in *The Politics of European Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches*, edited by Schimmelfennig, Frank and Ulrich Sedelmeier. New York: Routledge, 52-75.

relationships between variables (as in quantitative research) taking into consideration the specificity of each of the cases (as in qualitative research). The advantages of the method rest on its context-specific assessment, its ability to examine complex causal patterns and produce parsimonious as well as alternative explanations.⁸ QCA is most appropriate in studies where causal heterogeneity (the existence of multiple causation) and equifinality (different combinations of causes lead to the same outcome) is expected.⁹ QCA is much more compatible with the analysis of causal complexity where a number of variables have shown to be empirically significant. Rather than excluding or making a choice among alternative conditions on EU enlargement, the use of QCA makes possible the examining of complex patterns of interactions between all the hypothesized variables.¹⁰ In addition, QCA is the proper method that does not lose track of the cases concerned¹¹ (the applicant states from South-East Europe) and at the same time can still produce generalized results.¹²

The study is a cross-country longitudinal analysis and the unit of analysis will be time- and country-specific. The time span includes the years 1992-2012 and the sample consists of five South-East European countries.¹³ In order to empirically test the importance of conditions that matter in EU's enlargement South-East, the research utilizes both qualitative and quantitative data from political science databases such as Polity IV, Economic Freedom Index, World Bank Governance Indicator, Eurobarometers and Chapel Hill's party preferences. The EU enlargement outcome is operationalized, taking into account the main political enlargement decisions; that is the decision to open association negotiations and the decision to open/close accession negotiations for each of the applicant SEE countries.

1. EU Enlargement process: the major political events

Enlargement, in a very broad usage, refers to the overall process whereby potential member-states start the formal process of moving towards negotiations and membership.¹⁴ Enlargement is a process and not an event of simply adding new states, thus it is more about politics on both sides, the candidate countries seeking membership as well as the EU and member-states.¹⁵ We follow Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, conceptualizing EU enlargement "as a process of *gradual and formal horizontal institutionalization* of organizational

⁸ Ragin, Charles. 1987. *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies*. Berkeley: University of California Press; Ragin, Charles. 2000. *Fuzzy-Set Social Science*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; Schneider, Carsten and Claudius Wagemann. 2003. *Improving Inference with a 'Two-step' Approach: Theory and Limited Diversity in fs/QCA*. European University Institute (EUI) Working Paper SPS No. 2003/7, San Domenico: EUI. (accessed: 18 March 2014); Ragin, Charles. 2008. *Redesigning Social Inquiry: Fuzzy Sets and Beyond*, University of Chicago Press.

⁹ Ragin, *The Comparative Method*; Ragin, *Fuzzy-Set Social Science*.

¹⁰ Schneider and Wagemann, *Improving Interference*, 7-8.

¹¹ Ragin, *Redesigning Social Inquiry*, 181.

¹² Ragin, *Redesigning Social Inquiry*, 5.

¹³ Due to data constraints, we consider only Bulgaria and Rumania from the year 1992 until the year 2007 when they joined the EU, and the country of Macedonia, Croatia and Turkey from 1996 until 2012.

¹⁴ Pridham, Geoffrey. 2008. *The Arrival of Enlargement Studies: Patterns and Problems*, Keynote Address at the First Annual Assessing Accession Research Symposium: Central & Eastern Europe in the EU – Silent Partners?, University of Glasgow, 6-7 June 2008, 2.

¹⁵ Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, *Theorizing EU Enlargement*, 504; Mattli and Plümper, *The demand-side politics*.

rules and norms.”¹⁶ The process of gradual and formal institutionalization implies the establishment of special institutional relations between EU and the applicant country. It acknowledges the different formal stages until the accession of the candidate country. Thus, EU enlargement process is a complex multiple step process, involving many formal sub-stages where at every step accession still can be stopped.¹⁷

For coding the formal sub-stage of the enlargement process, we focus on the main political EU enlargement events: that is, the decision to open/close association negotiations (Europe Agreements for CEE and Stabilization and Association Agreements for WB) and the decision to open/close accession negotiations.¹⁸ Each of the formal institutionalized stages are characterized by a different probability of membership.¹⁹ Thus, the status of EU integration and its respective membership probability are coded according to an ordinal scale ranging from ‘no membership’ to ‘full membership’ prospects, based on the event data of whether a country has open/closed association or accession negotiation. The ‘no membership’ status corresponds to no institutional relations (association negotiations has not been open yet) thus a 0 membership probability is assigned; whereas the ‘full membership’ status corresponds to the signing of the accession treaty, hence membership probability is almost 1. For the intermediary phase we assign the value of 0.17 when a country opens association negotiations; the value of 0.33 when a country closes association negotiations; the value of 0.67 if accession negotiations are open and a value of 0.84 if a country is closing accession negotiation. With regards to the EU integration threshold (0.5), - the undecided membership probability, - the major distinction to be considered is if the aspiring country has received the status of candidate countries or not. The data on membership probability (enlargement index) measures biannually (January-June and July-December) the enlargement status of every country according to their contractual relations with EU achieved at each specific 6-months time-period.

2. Theoretical framework and systemic factors related to EU enlargement

Theoretical explanations of EU enlargement decisions and politics come in roughly two major varieties. The liberal inter-governmentalist approach accounting for the EU decision to enlarge in terms of state preferences²⁰ and the constructivist approach focusing on the constructions of EU identity and

¹⁶ Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, *Theorizing EU Enlargement*, 601; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, *The politics of EU enlargement*, 5.

¹⁷ Steunenberg, Bernard and Antoaneta Dimitrova. 2007. *Compliance in the EU Enlargement Process: The Limits of Conditionality*. *European Integration online Papers* 11(5), 11. (accessed: 18 March 2014).

¹⁸ Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2008. EU Political Accession Conditionality after Enlargement: Consistency and Effectiveness. *Journal of European Public Policy* 15(6), 922.

¹⁹ Böhmelt, Tobias and Tina Freyburg. 2012. The temporal dimension of the credibility of EU conditionality and candidate states’ compliance with the *acquis communautaire*, 1998-2009. *European Union Politics* 14(2), 250-72.

²⁰ Moravcsik, Andrew and Milada Anna Vachudova. 2005. *Preferences, power and equilibrium: The causes and consequences of EU enlargement*, in *The Politics of European Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches*, edited by Schimmelfennig, Frank and Ulrich, Sedelmeier. New York: Routledge, 198-212.

norms.²¹ So far, EU enlargement policy has been widely explained in terms of constructivist institutionalism, unlike most other areas of European integration currently dominated by liberal inter-governmentalism.²² From a constructivist perspective, the ‘liberal-democratic political values and norms’²³ or the ‘common identity’²⁴ shared by both the applicant and the union are the major conditions to account for decisions on enlargement.

2.1. The liberal-democratic community hypothesis

“In the constructivist perspective, sharing a community of values and norms with outside states is both necessary and sufficient for their admission to the organization.”²⁵ Given the liberal-democratic political value foundations of the EU, it implies that for any potential country to join EU it is obligatory that the applicant countries first reach EU liberal values and norms before joining the Union. Empirical studies show that EU restricts enlargement to liberal democracies. Schimmelfennig finds that democracy and reference to liberal norms are not merely symbolic but they really and systematically matter for the entire process of enlargement in all its major political events.²⁶ Further studies show that EU, as in the case of CEEC countries, still links the progress toward accession consistently with the progress toward political conditionality.²⁷ A further enlargement to a group of ‘fragile democracies’ is seen by some member-state countries as undesirable, if not destabilizing.²⁸ The more democratic a non member-state, the higher its likelihood of establishing institutionalized relations and being admitted to the EU; whereas the less democratic an applicant state is the higher the risk of being excluded from membership.²⁹ Thus, the more a South-East European state complied with EU liberal norms, the more likely it is to establish institutionalized relations with EU and to become an EU member-state country.

To operationalize the variable of liberal-democratic community, we use the Polity IV dataset (version 2012) as the most prominent source for measuring democracy.³⁰ The polity variable ranges from -10 (strong autocracy) to +10 (strong democracy) and it is computed by subtracting a state’s autocracy score from its democracy score, measuring the competitiveness and openness of exec-

²¹ Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2005a. *The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union*, in *The Politics of European Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches*, edited by Schimmelfennig, Frank and Ulrich Sedelmeier. New York: Routledge, 142-71.

²² Moravcsik, Andrew and Milada Anna Vachudova. 2005. *Preferences, power and equilibrium: The causes and consequences of EU enlargement*, in *The Politics of European Union Enlargement: Theoretical Approaches*, edited by Schimmelfennig, Frank and Ulrich, Sedelmeier. New York: Routledge, 198-212.

²³ Schimmelfennig, Frank. 2001. The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union. *International Organization* 55(1), 47-80.

²⁴ Sjursen, *Why Expand*.

²⁵ Schimmelfennig 2001, *The Community Trap*, 61.

²⁶ Schimmelfennig, *Liberal Community*.

²⁷ See Schimmelfennig, *EU Political Accession Conditionality*.

²⁸ Fierke, Karin. M. and Antje Wiener. 1999. Constructing Institutional Interests: EU and NATO Enlargement. *Journal of European Public Policy* 6(5), 721.

²⁹ Schimmelfennig 2005a, *The Community Trap*, 147.

³⁰ The Polity IV dataset is widely used indicators of the level and quality of democracy, providing a comprehensive and differentiated methodology.

utive recruitment, constraints on the chief executive, and competitiveness and regulation of political participation. To calibrate the data we use the value 0 as a cross-over point and the data maximum and minimum (10 and -10).

2.2. Economic interests or/and bureaucratic effectiveness hypothesis

In addition to the liberal community hypothesis there is the material cost-benefits calculations of enlargement and the administrative effectiveness of the applicants to cope with EU acquis. Once accession negotiations are open, it is all the more important to bear in mind that the applicant countries need to comply with all EU acquis. The EU membership criteria outlined at the Copenhagen European Council conclusions³¹, although progressively elaborated, they have served as guiding principles in determining which countries are ready to be invited for membership.³² Thus, EU membership is conditional not only on fulfilling the political criteria of a liberal democracy, but also on the economic criteria of a functioning market economy and on the administrative capacity to implement the EU acquis.

To operationalize the market economy variable we rely on the Economic Freedom index compiled by the Heritage Foundation. The index takes into account a broad range of economic indicators, institutional and policy arrangements related to economic freedom (business and trade freedom, the fiscal freedom factor and the freedom from government, monetary, investment and financial freedom, property rights, freedom from corruption and labour freedom). The index is comprehensive and combines a number of economic freedoms factors and is comprehensive in indicating 'the existence of a functioning market economy'. It ranges from 0 to 100, where 0 corresponds to no economic freedom at all, while 100 the maximum economic freedom. To calibrate the data we use the data anchors 100 and 0 (max and min) and 50 as the cross-over point.

The administrative effectiveness is compiled using the updated data from the World Bank Governance indicators.³³ The *government effectiveness* indicator reflects analysts' ratings on the quality and independence from political pressure of the bureaucracy, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies combined into a single grouping. The main focus of this index is on "inputs" required for the government to be able to produce and implement good policies and deliver public goods. The government effectiveness scores, although based on subjective evaluation of experts, come conceptually close to the EU administrative requirements. The data are standardized values following a normal distribu-

³¹ According to the Presidency's conclusions of the Copenhagen European Council (21-22 June 1993) the candidate countries have to achieve: 1) stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities; 2) the existence of a functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the Union; 3) and demonstrated its ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic, and monetary union.

³² Hillion, Christophe. 2011. *EU Enlargement in The evolution of EU law*, edited by Craig, Paul and Gráinne de Búrca. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 194.

³³ Kaufmann, Daniel / Kraay, Aart and Massimo Mastruzzi. 2010. *The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology and Analytical Issues*, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 5430. (accessed: 18 March 2014).

tion. All scores lie between -2.5 and 2.5 with a mean of 0; values used for calibration.

2.3. The member-state preferences hypothesis

According to the liberal inter-governmentalist approach, in order to explain EU enlargement decisions it is plausible to consider the member-state enlargement preferences. The inter-governmentalist model is best suited to explain EU enlargement given the central role played by member-states through the European Council in the enlargement process and inter-governmental bargaining. Especially, after CEE joined the Union, the member-states have ‘nationalized’ EU enlargement reaffirming their influence not only on the conduct but also on the procedural aspects of the EU enlargement policy.³⁴ Empirical studies find support on the member-states’ interests as an important factor in defining EU decision outcomes.³⁵ The importance of member-state preference is more pronounced in EU enlargement policy because it is particularly a delicate issue area where the EU member-states would like to have the final word.³⁶ The importance of the member-states in the EU enlargement process becomes even more obvious and influential once the member-state has the EU presidency. The turning point for the integration of the countries of the Western Balkans was in 1999 under the German EU presidency, were for the first time Western Balkans started to be perceived as part of Europe.³⁷ This is not meaningless, knowing that Germany was the promoter of the idea of Eastward enlargement. The next important achievement for the Western Balkans was under the Greek presidency in 2003 making the Western Balkans also a ‘key priority’ and the Balkan Summit paves the way for deeper integration of the WB countries into EU.³⁸

For operationalizing member-state enlargement preferences we rely on Chapel Hill’s expert survey of party preferences.³⁹ Data on party preferences are extracted from question on parties’ stance on EU enlargement (the general question on party positioning towards EU enlargement, and the specific question in

³⁴ “[...] Article 49 TEU foresees that the candidate’s application is to be sent to the Council, which decides by unanimity after the Commission has provided its Opinion and the EP its consent. While the procedure gives the impression that it only takes its decision once the other institutions have been consulted, in practice however, the Council decides at an early stage, and such decision(s) determines the fate of an application. A custom has thus developed according to which the Commission only prepares and gives its ‘Opinion’ on the application, once it has actually been requested to do so by the Council.” See Hillion, *EU Enlargement*, 205-6.

³⁵ Thomson, Robert and Madeleine Hosli. 2006. Who Has Power in the EU? The Commission, Council and Parliament in Legislative Decision-making”, *Journal of Common Market Studies* 44(2), 391-417.

³⁶ Müftüler-Bac, Meltem and Lauren M. Mc Laren. 2003. Enlargement Preferences and Policy-Making in the European Union: Impacts on Turkey. *Journal of European Integration* 25, 19.

³⁷ Friis Lykke and Anna Murphy. 2000. ‘Turbo-Charged Negotiations’: The EU and the Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe. *Journal of European Public Policy* 7(5), 769.

³⁸ Meurs, Wim Van. 2003. The next Europe: South-eastern Europe after Thessaloniki. *South-East Europe Review* 6(3), 9.

³⁹ Hooghe, Liesbet / Bakker, Ryan / Brigeovich, Anna / de Vries, Catherine / Edwards, Erica / Marks, Gary / Rovny, Jan / Steenbergen, Marco and Milada, Vachudova. 2010. Reliability and Validity of Measuring Party Positions: The Chapel Hill Expert Surveys of 2002 and 2006. *European Journal of Political Research* 49(5), 687-703.

2006 on party position on EU enlargement to Turkey).⁴⁰ Although the survey was conducted in specific years (2002, 2006) we assume estimates to hold true for the years before and after the measurement. For each semester of the year (1992-2012) we calculate the score of the major government party that holds the EU presidency. Calibration uses the survey scale; the value of 4 (neutral) as the cross-over point while the extreme anchors are the minimum value of 1 (strongly opposes) and the maximum value of 7 (strongly favours).

In addition to government party preferences, public opinion matters. Traditionally public opinions either have not been articulated or have been ignored, thus generally playing only a marginal role in EU decisions to enlarge, yet after the latest enlargement, the popular concern about the process is being heard and member-state governments are responding accordingly.⁴¹ Thus the perceptions of the EU citizens from now on had to be taken into close consideration. On this background the interplay between attitudes of political elites and public opinion remains important.⁴² Moreover, an empirical study, finds support on the hypothesis that the public opinion on EU related issues influence the EU policy decisions.⁴³

The data on the public support for EU enlargement are taken from a Eurobarometer survey. To measure EU public support for each of the applicant countries we consider the percentage of all EU citizens responding on the following question: ‘for each of the following countries, are you in favour or not of it becoming part of the European Union in the future?’ We consider the percentage of citizens’ score multiplied by the corresponding identification scale (1 = ‘in favour’, 0.5 = ‘DK - Don't know’, 0 = ‘Not in favour’) and then sum-up to form an index of EU public support for EU enlargement. The missing data for certain time periods are a serious concern, yet we retain the variable to get an indication of the significance or not of the public opinion for the given data. See table 2 in the appendix.

⁴⁰ For 2002, Enlargw = position of the party leadership in 2002 on enlargement. The question Q11: “Finally, consider EU enlargement to the candidate countries of post-communist Europe. Some parties strongly support admitting a large wave of new members (six to eight)* by 2005; others are opposed or show great reluctance. Where does the party leadership of the following parties stand?” For 2006, Turkey = position of the party leadership in 2006 on EU enlargement to Turkey. The question Q9: “What position did the party leadership take over the course of 2006 on the following policies? EU enlargement to Turkey.”

⁴¹ Such a negative/opposing trend by the citizens on EU enlargement puts EU officials on a strong and growing anti-enlargement feeling which may result in “weakening the political imperative to enlarge, allowing member states to become more critical of enlargement and question the speed and indeed the desirability of the process.” See Phinnemore, David. 2006. Beyond 25 - the Changing Face of EU Enlargement: Commitment, Conditionality and the Constitutional Treaty. *Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans* 8(1), 20.

⁴² Lippert, Barbara. 2010. *The EU Enlargement: In Search of A New Momentum*, in *Poland and the Czech Republic: Advocates of the EU Enlargement?*, edited by Balcer, Adam. Warsaw: Demos Europa, Center for European Strategy, 69.

⁴³ Toshkov, Dimitar. 2011. Public opinion and policy output in the European Union: A lost relationship. *European Union Politics* 12(2), 169-91.

3. Analysis and results: necessary and sufficient conditions for enlargement

I use the software package, fsQCA 2.0⁴⁴ (version date January 2009) as a data processing tool for ‘fuzzy set’ QCA analysis. The analysis uses Boolean algebra to determine the necessary and/or sufficient conditions for the outcome Enlargement. In Qualitative Comparative Analysis conditions shared by cases with the same outcome are identified as necessary conditions while conditions are sufficient if cases with the same (combinations of) conditions display the same outcome.⁴⁵ In the case of fsQCA, a cause is necessary when its score is consistently higher than or equal to the score of the outcome that is the outcome is a subset of the cause. A cause is sufficient when its score is consistently lower than or equal to the score of the outcome, that is, the cause is now a subset of the outcome. Given that strictly necessary and sufficient conditions are exceptional, it is better to interpret the results as possible rather than certain, relying on the ‘quasi-necessary’ and ‘quasi-sufficient’ conditions, the situation where causal conditions might be necessary/sufficient in most of the cases but not in all of them.⁴⁶

Consistency and coverage⁴⁷ are the two measures of reliability or of fit of the model, the same way that *significance* and *strength* are important in statistical analysis. Consistency gauges *theoretical importance* while coverage gauges only *empirical importance*, so it is reasonable to calculate and establish first consistency and then calculate its coverage because a relation may be empirically ‘rare’ (low coverage) but still centrally relevant to theory (consistency high).⁴⁸ In general, values of consistency considered as ‘good’ or ‘acceptable’ on 30-60 cases is 0.75 or higher but in any case a value of consistency below 0.75 is considered *substantially* inconsistent.⁴⁹ As suggested, necessary and sufficient conditions should be analyzed in separate analytical steps, starting first with the analysis of necessary conditions before examining sufficiency so if there are any necessary conditions they will be kept in sufficiency test through the intermediate solution.⁵⁰

3.1. Test of necessity

Testing for the necessity of enlargement outcome, the condition of liberal democracy (polity), and EU presidency council preferences (eucouncpref) show good consistency values (above 93%). They are to be considered as almost-

⁴⁴ Software available at [fuzzy set / Qualitative Comparative Analysis](#). (accessed: 18 March 2014).

⁴⁵ Ragin, *Fuzzy-Set Social Science*, 92 and 271.

⁴⁶ Ragin, *Fuzzy-Set Social Science*, 109 and 114; Wagemann, Claudius and Carsten Schneider. 2007. *Standards of good practice in qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and fuzzy-sets*. COMPASS Working papers No. 51, 4. (accessed: 18 March 2014).

⁴⁷ Consistency is a measure of the degree to which the cases sharing a given combination of conditions agree in displaying the outcome in question; it responds to *how often* the solution terms and the solution as a whole are subsets of the outcome; See: Ragin, Charles. 2006. Set Relations in Social Research: Evaluating Their Consistency and Coverage. *Political Analysis* 14(3), 297; Ragin, *Redesigning Social Inquiry*, 45-46. Coverage gauges empirical relevance or importance; it responds to *how much* of the outcome is explained by each solution term and the solution as a whole (Ragin, Set Relations in Social Research, 301; Ragin, *Redesigning Social Inquiry*, 44-45).

⁴⁸ Ragin, *Redesigning Social Inquiry*, 55.

⁴⁹ Ragin, *Fuzzy-Set Social Science*; Wagemann and Schneider, *Standards of good practice*, 29.

⁵⁰ Ragin 2009: 110; Wagemann and Schneider, *Standards of good practice*, 14.

always necessary causes for EU enlargement decisions. The condition of liberal democracy is fully consistent (98%) and the EU presidency council preferences are consistent in 94% of the cases. Both conditions explain most of the EU enlargement decisions (about 66%) in the South-East European countries.⁵¹ The market economy (econfree) condition is often a necessary condition, yet it needs to be taken with very caution. The rest of the conditions, the administrative criteria (goveffe) and EU public support for enlargement (eupublicsup) are not to be considered as necessary conditions.

Table 3: Analysis of Necessary Conditions

Conditions tested:	Outcome variable: enlargement	
	Consistency	Coverage
polity	0.981793	0.662231
econfree	0.813355	0.873676
goveffe	0.731413	0.924257
euCouncilpref	0.937786	0.671739
eupublicsup	0.729516	0.913973

3.2. Test of sufficiency

It is very important to examine first the distribution of cases across conditions (QCA Manual). With 5 causal conditions, there are 32 (2^5) logically possible arguments (causal combinations), graphically 32 rows in the truth table. The 166 empirical cases are unevenly distributed. Our data gives 7 empirical cases with 25 combinations failing to show empirical evidence (limited diversity). Thus, the test of sufficiency risks the danger of limited diversity as we have too many conditions and not enough cases. The procedure to handle this limitation regards the treatment of empirically absent configurations, the so called ‘remainders’, in different ways.⁵² The most conservative strategy is to treat logical reminders as instances of the absence of the outcome producing the most complex solution, no logical reminders are used assuming that they would not produce the outcome; or secondly, set logical reminders as simplifying ‘don’t care’ assumptions without evaluating their plausibility in order to produce the most parsimonious solution; a third intermediate solution permits only ‘easy counterfactual’ for which we have existing knowledge, lowering the risk of drawing wrong inference about counterfactuals in data of limited diversity.⁵³ To learn more about the robustness of the solution models, we run the standard analysis and report the complex, the parsimonious and the intermediate solu-

⁵¹ A condition may be fully consistent but its low coverage implies less empirical importance in a specific outcome.

⁵² The remaining 25 logical reminders are thus available as potential counterfactual cases for further logical simplification.

⁵³ Ragin, Charles and John Sonnett. 2004. *Between Complexity and Parsimony: Limited Diversity, Counterfactual Cases and Comparative Analysis*, in *Vergleichen in der Politikwissenschaft*, edited by Kropp, Sabine and Michael Minkenberg. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 180-97.

tions in Table IV. For the intermediate solution,⁵⁴ following the results of the necessary test, we made the assumptions that EU council presidency preferences and liberal democracy should be present in EU enlargement decisions, since both of them were *almost always* necessary for EU enlargement.

Table 4: Baseline Models, Consistency and Coverage Solution for Enlargement Outcome

Model: enlarge = f(polity, econfree, goveffe, eucouncpref, eupublicsup)				
Rows: 7 frequency cut-off: 1.000000 consistency cut-off: 0.952280		Raw coverage	Unique coverage	Consistency
Complex and Intermediate solution ⁵⁵	polity*econfree*goveffe*eucouncpref	0.709410	0.709410	0.954082
	solution coverage: 0.709410 solution consistency: 0.954082			
Parsimonious solution ⁵⁶	polity*goveffe + econfree*goveffe	0.731413 0.709410	0.022003 -0.000000	0.955401 0.926660
	solution coverage: 0.731413 solution consistency: 0.928709			

Note: We choose a frequency threshold of 1 and a demanding consistency threshold of (approximately) 0.95. In the fsQCA program although the 0.95 value is put as consistency cut-off value, in the results the lowest actual value above this cut-off value is shown; the value is reported in the table. The Intermediate solution with the assumption eucouncpref (present) and polity (present) gave the same results as the complex solution.

Model of EU Enlargement⁵⁷ = polity*eucouncpref*econfree*goveffe

Thus, EU enlargement is sufficiently explained if applicant states have a liberal democracy, a market economy and administrative capacities and the EU council presidency preferences are in favour of EU enlargement. The model is almost always consistent (95%) and explains more than 70% of the EU major political enlargement events in the South-East European countries.

⁵⁴ Given the limited diversity of our data, we prefer for interpretation the intermediate solution so to lower the risk of drawing wrong inference about the mechanical counterfactuals used in the parsimonious and complex solution.

⁵⁵ Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term polity*econfree*goveffe*eucouncpref: tr08-I (0.58,0.67), bl05-II (0.56,1), hr06-II (0.55,0.67), tr06-II (0.55,0.67), hr05-II (0.53,0.67), tr05-II (0.51,0.67).

⁵⁶ Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term polity*goveffe: hr06-II (0.66,0.67), hr05-II (0.64,0.67), tr08-I (0.58,0.67), bl05-II (0.56,1), tr05-II (0.55,0.67), tr06-II (0.55,0.67).

Cases with greater than 0.5 membership in term econfree*goveffe: tr08-I (0.58,0.67), bl05-II (0.56,1), hr06-II (0.55,0.67), tr06-II (0.55,0.67), hr05-II (0.53,0.67), tr05-II (0.51,0.67).

⁵⁷ Supplementary Check Analysis: Given the missing data, we drop the EU public opinion variable (eupublicsup) from the model. Yet, the solution's formula still holds with very minor changes. When we set a frequency cutoff value greater than 4 and a 0.9 consistency cutoff, the baseline model (polity*econfree*goveffe*eucouncpref) is kept while an alternative path is added (eucouncpref*~goveffe*~econfree*polity, cases refer to Bulgaria and Romania). This new model is 90% consistent and explains 78% of the cases. If we refer to the empirical measure of (unique and/or raw) coverage to argue on the solution path that is more important (Wagemann and Schneider, *Standards of good practice*, 27), we find that our baseline model (polity*econfree*goveffe*eucouncpref) has a raw coverage of 0.75 and a unique coverage of 0.16 (greater than the alternative solution), thus indicating that the share of the outcome is exclusively explained by our baseline model.

In sum, the fsQCA analysis finds that the liberal democracy hypothesis and the member-state enlargement preferences are systematically important, necessary and in some cases also sufficient conditions that determine the speed of the entire enlargement process. The empirical significance of the liberal community hypothesis met the theoretical expectations and shows consistency on the application of EU political accession conditionality. Yet, it is not sufficient. Member-states preferences prove to be a substantive explanatory variable, equally important with liberal community hypothesis in explaining EU enlargement decisions. The condition of having a functional market economy and effective administrative capacity proved to be not systematically related to the major political events of EU enlargement process. Yet, they are part of the sufficient model of EU enlargement. The EU public opinion, proved to be not (at least directly) relevant in understanding and explaining decision making on EU enlargement into South-East European countries. Yet, EU public support may influence the process indirectly, being reflected into the member-state party preferences. This however is to be considered with great caution since we lack time-series data for many years.

Conclusions

The article examines the main theoretically plausible and empirically important propositions in EU Enlargement literature and search for necessity and sufficiency in the explanation of EU Enlargement major events (1992-2012) in five countries of South-East Europe. The findings of the comparative analysis have considerable theoretical relevance and policy importance.

With regards to the theoretical contribution, the study finds the liberal community and the inter-governmentalist approaches to correctly highlight the importance of the liberal community and member-state enlargement preferences. The analysis suggests that democratic consolidation of the applicant states and the preferences of EU member-states are likely to be important for the entire enlargement politics. The defining characteristics of a liberal state and the pro-enlargement preferences of the EU member-states are the determinant factors of the general pace and speed of EU enlargement. Whereas, the condition of having a functional market economy and effective administrative capacity, although part of the sufficiency model, as well as the EU public opinion do not relate systematically to the enlargement decision-making process.

With regards to policy implications, the study provides insights on the future membership perspective for the rest of the South-East European countries waiting to join the EU. First of all, the relevance of the liberal community hypothesis in EU enlargement decisions shows that the EU has been consistent in linking accession with the applicant's compliance with democratic norms and values. If EU enlargement decisions are consistent with EU political conditionality, compliance with EU economic and administrative conditions is more flexible and do not always relate to the upgrading of institutionalized relation with the applicant countries.⁵⁸ Secondly, the dependency of enlargement decision-making on the member-state preferences risk to decrease the effectiveness of EU accession conditionality if a group of member-states prefers either uncondi-

⁵⁸ See footnote 17, the alternative path to enlargement model, where the functional market economy and effective bureaucracy is lacking, e.g. the case of Romania and Bulgaria.

tional exclusion (as in the case of Turkey) or unconditional fast track acceptance (evident in the case of Serbia).⁵⁹ The decrease of EU accession conditionality as result of potential unfair treatment would halt democratic reforms in the applicant states. On the other hand, given that accession is linked to the democratic and compliance progress in the applicant states, it may give arguments to some member-states to freeze or introduce alternative forms of membership.

Thus, EU enlargement is a two-fold process where both the EU/member-states politics and the applicant states politics need to be considered. It is not only the candidate which needs to comply with EU norms and values but EU and member-states should be willing of accepting new countries. The timing of accession depends not just on the preparations of applicant countries but it depends also greatly on how the EU member-states and EU integration will develop. On the demand side, the politicians of the applicant countries need to construct a liberal democracy, a market economy and effective administration to take the EU acquis, thus complying with EU requirements. While on the supply side there is a need for member-states and EU decision-making institutions to strongly support admitting new member-state countries.

To conclude, EU enlargement is a ‘tango dance by two’. The applicant countries must satisfy the EU requirements of liberal democracy, market economy and administrative requirements, yet they are not sufficient enough to guarantee EU membership. In addition to the necessary domestic transformations of the applicant countries, the member-state willingness to admit other countries is the other necessary condition which makes it sufficient for EU accession to happen.

Yet, Enlargement is still an ongoing process and further studies will have to assess how Enlargement politics will evolve. The remaining countries of the South-East Europe lagged behind the recent admitted countries of Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia in democratic consolidation, economic reforms and compliance with EU rules. It is an interesting question to see whether EU and member-states would be willing to lower ‘accession’ standards or would they create even stronger conditions in the light of an increase of anti-enlargement preferences. It makes particularly important to see the stance that the forthcoming EU presidencies will take, given that EU integration is facing hard time.

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⁵⁹ Lavenex, Sandra and Frank Schimmelfennig. 2008. Relations with the Wider Europe. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 46, 154.

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Appendix

Table 1: Data on the EU Enlargement major events and membership probability

Year	Semester	Bulgaria		Romania		Turkey		Croatia		Macedonia		
		EU Enlargement major events	Enlarg. Index	EU Enlargement major events	Enlarg. Index	EU Enlargement major events	Enlarg. Index	EU Enlargement major events	Enlarg. Index	EU Enlargement major events	Enlarg. Index	
1992	92-I	May 1992, started negotiations for Europe Agreements	0.17	May 1992, started negotiations for Europe Agreements	0.17							
	92-II		0.17		0.17							
1993	93-I	8 March 1993, European Agreement were concluded	0.33	8 March 1993, European Agreement were concluded	0.33							
	93-II		0.33		0.33							
1994	94-I		0.33		0.33							
	94-II		0.33		0.33							
1995	95-I		0.33		0.33							
	95-II		0.33		0.33							
1996	96-I		0.33		0.33							
	96-II		0.33		0.33							
1997	97-I		0.33		0.33	European Economic Community signed in 1963 the Ankara Association Agreement	0.33	No institutionalization	0	No institutionalization	0	
	97-II	December 1997, European Council endorsed the Commission's opinion on membership applications	0.5	December 1997, European Council endorsed the Commission's opinion on membership applications	0.5		0.33		0		0	
1998	98-I		0.5		0.5		0.33		0		0	
	98-II		0.5		0.5		0.33		0		0	
1999	99-I	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.33		0		0			
	99-II	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5	0	0					
2000	00-I		0.67		0.67	December 1999, European Council gives Turkey the status of candidate country for EU membership	0.5	November 2000, SAA negotiations were opened	0	March 2000, start of Stabilisation and Association Negotiations	0.17	
	00-II		0.67		0.67		0.5		0.17		0.17	
2001	01-I	February 2000, Accession Negotiations were opened	0.67	February 2000, Accession Negotiations were opened	0.67	0.5	29 October 2001, Stabilisation and Association Agreement signed	0.17	9 April 2001, Stabilisation and Association Agreement is signed in Luxembourg	0.33	0.33	
	01-II		0.67		0.67	0.5		0.33		0.33		
2002	02-I		0.67		0.67	0.5		0.33		0.33		
	02-II		0.67		0.67	0.5		0.33		0.33		
2003	03-I		0.67		0.67	0.5	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33		
	03-II		0.67		0.67	0.5	0.33	0.33	0.33	0.33		

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2004	04-I		0.67		0.67		0.5		0.5		0.33
	04-II	17 December 2004, European Council confirmed the conclusion of Accession Negotiations	0.84	17 December 2004, European Council confirmed the conclusion of Accession Negotiations	0.84		0.5	June 2004, European Council confirms Croatia as Candidate Country	0.5		0.33
2005	05-I		1		1		0.5		0.5		0.33
	05-II		1		1		0.67		0.67		0.5
2006	06-I		1		1		0.67		0.67		0.5
	06-II		1		1		0.67		0.67		0.5
2007	07-I		1		1		0.67		0.67		0.5
	07-II		1		1		0.67		0.67		0.5
2008	08-I						0.67		0.67		0.5
	08-II						0.67		0.67		0.5
2009	09-I						0.67		0.67		0.5
	09-II						0.67		0.67		0.5
2010	10-I						0.67		0.67		0.5
	10-II						0.67		0.67		0.5
2011	11-I						0.67	30 June 2011, EU close Accession Negotiations	0.84		0.5
	11-II						0.67		1		0.5
2012	12-I						0.67	9 December 2011, Croatia signs	1		0.5
	12-II						0.67	Accession Treaty	1		0.5

Table 2: Causal Conditions, Data and their Calibration into Fuzzy sets

case	Country	year	Enlarge Index	Polity		Economic Freedom		Government Effectiveness		EU Council Presidency - Party preferences		EU public support
				Data	Fuzzy-set	Data	Fuzzy-set	Data	Fuzzy-set	Data	Fuzzy-set	Fuzzy-set
hr96-I	Croatia	1996	0	-5	0.18	48	0.47	0.07	0.52	6	0.88	0.415
hr96-II	Croatia		0		0.18		0.47		0.52	5.75	0.85	
hr97-I	Croatia	1997	0	-5	0.18	46.7	0.45			5.75	0.85	
hr97-II	Croatia		0		0.18		0.45					
hr98-I	Croatia	1998	0	-5	0.18	51.7	0.53	0.06	0.52	6.06	0.89	
hr98-II	Croatia		0		0.18		0.53		0.52	6.13	0.89	
hr99-I	Croatia	1999	0			53.1	0.55			6.14	0.89	
hr99-II	Croatia		0				0.55			5.63	0.84	
hr00-I	Croatia	2000	0	8	0.92	53.6	0.55	0.31	0.59	5.83	0.86	
hr00-II	Croatia		0.17		0.92		0.55		0.59	5.36	0.8	
hr01-I	Croatia	2001	0.17	8	0.92	50.7	0.51			6.83	0.94	
hr01-II	Croatia		0.33		0.92		0.51			5.82	0.86	0.435
hr02-I	Croatia	2002	0.33	8	0.92	51.1	0.52	0.34	0.6	5	0.73	
hr02-II	Croatia		0.33		0.92		0.52		0.6	6.54	0.93	
hr03-I	Croatia	2003	0.33	8	0.92	53.3	0.55	0.38	0.61	6.55	0.93	
hr03-II	Croatia		0.33		0.92		0.55		0.61	5.36	0.8	
hr04-I	Croatia	2004	0.5	8	0.92	53.1	0.55	0.47	0.64	5.38	0.8	
hr04-II	Croatia		0.5		0.92		0.55		0.64	5.13	0.76	
hr05-I	Croatia	2005	0.5	9	0.94	51.9	0.53	0.48	0.64			0.59
hr05-II	Croatia		0.67		0.94		0.53		0.64	6.06	0.89	0.58
hr06-I	Croatia	2006	0.67	9	0.94	53.6	0.55	0.57	0.66	6.63	0.93	
hr06-II	Croatia		0.67		0.94		0.55		0.66	5	0.73	0.565
hr07-I	Croatia	2007	0.67	9	0.94	53.4	0.55	0.48	0.64	6.14	0.89	
hr07-II	Croatia		0.67		0.94		0.55		0.64	5.83	0.86	
hr08-I	Croatia	2008	0.67	9	0.94	54.1	0.56	0.58	0.67			0.59
hr08-II	Croatia		0.67		0.94		0.56		0.67	4.67	0.66	
hr09-I	Croatia	2009	0.67	9	0.94	55.1	0.58	0.61	0.67			

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hr09-II	Croatia		0.67		0.94		0.58		0.67	6.42	0.92	
hr10-I	Croatia	2010	0.67	9	0.94	59.2	0.63	0.62	0.68	5.23	0.77	
hr10-II	Croatia		0.67		0.94		0.63		0.68	5.1	0.75	
hr11-I	Croatia	2011	0.84	9	0.94	61.1	0.66	0.55	0.66			
hr11-II	Croatia		1		0.94		0.66		0.66			
hr12-I	Croatia	2012	1	9	0.94	60.9	0.66			6.46	0.92	
hr12-II	Croatia		1		0.94		0.66					
mc96-I	Macedonia	1996	0	6	0.86			-0.62	0.32	6	0.88	
mc96-II	Macedonia		0		0.86				0.32	5.75	0.85	
mc97-I	Macedonia	1997	0	6	0.86					5.75	0.85	
mc97-II	Macedonia		0		0.86							
mc98-I	Macedonia	1998	0	6	0.86			-0.62	0.32	6.06	0.89	
mc98-II	Macedonia		0		0.86				0.32	6.13	0.89	
mc99-I	Macedonia	1999	0	6	0.86					6.14	0.89	
mc99-II	Macedonia		0		0.86					5.63	0.84	
mc00-I	Macedonia	2000	0.17	6	0.86			-0.78	0.28	5.83	0.86	
mc00-II	Macedonia		0.17		0.86				0.28	5.36	0.8	
mc01-I	Macedonia	2001	0.33	6	0.86					6.83	0.94	
mc01-II	Macedonia		0.33		0.86					5.82	0.86	0.4
mc02-I	Macedonia	2002	0.33	9	0.94	58	0.62	-0.50	0.36	5	0.73	
mc02-II	Macedonia		0.33		0.94		0.62		0.36	6.54	0.93	
mc03-I	Macedonia	2003	0.33	9	0.94	60.1	0.65	-0.33	0.4	6.55	0.93	
mc03-II	Macedonia		0.33		0.94		0.65		0.4	5.36	0.8	
mc04-I	Macedonia	2004	0.33	9	0.94	56.8	0.6	-0.13	0.46	5.38	0.8	
mc04-II	Macedonia		0.33		0.94		0.6		0.46	5.13	0.76	
mc05-I	Macedonia	2005	0.33	9	0.94	56.1	0.59	-0.28	0.42			0.51
mc05-II	Macedonia		0.5		0.94		0.59		0.42	6.06	0.89	0.495
mc06-I	Macedonia	2006	0.5	9	0.94	59.2	0.63	-0.11	0.47	6.63	0.93	
mc06-II	Macedonia		0.5		0.94		0.63		0.47	5	0.73	0.48
mc07-I	Macedonia	2007	0.5	9	0.94	60.6	0.65	-0.20	0.44	6.14	0.89	
mc07-II	Macedonia		0.5		0.94		0.65		0.44	5.83	0.86	

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mc08-I	Macedonia	2008	0.5	9	0.94	61.1	0.66	-0.02	0.5			0.485
mc08-II	Macedonia		0.5		0.94		0.66		0.5	4.67	0.66	
mc09-I	Macedonia	2009	0.5	9	0.94	61.2	0.66	-0.09	0.47			
mc09-II	Macedonia		0.5		0.94		0.66		0.47	6.42	0.92	
mc10-I	Macedonia	2010	0.5	9	0.94	65.7	0.72	-0.16	0.45	5.23	0.77	
mc10-II	Macedonia		0.5		0.94		0.72		0.45	5.1	0.75	
mc11-I	Macedonia	2011	0.5	9	0.94	66	0.72	-0.11	0.47			
mc11-II	Macedonia		0.5		0.94		0.72		0.47			
mc12-I	Macedonia	2012	0.5	9	0.94	68.5	0.75			6.46	0.92	
mc12-II	Macedonia		0.5		0.94		0.75					
bl92-I	Bulgaria	1992	0.17	8	0.92					5.83		
bl92-II	Bulgaria		0.17		0.92					5.22		
bl93-I	Bulgaria	1993	0.33	8	0.92					6.46		
bl93-II	Bulgaria		0.33		0.92					5.73		
bl94-I	Bulgaria	1994	0.33	8	0.92					6.55		
bl94-II	Bulgaria		0.33		0.92					6		0.57
bl95-I	Bulgaria	1995	0.33	8	0.92	50	0.5			4.67		
bl95-II	Bulgaria		0.33		0.92		0.5			5.23		
bl96-I	Bulgaria	1996	0.33	8	0.92	48.6	0.48	-0.31	0.41	6	0.88	0.475
bl96-II	Bulgaria		0.33		0.92		0.48		0.41	5.75	0.85	
bl97-I	Bulgaria	1997	0.33	8	0.92	47.6	0.46			5.75	0.85	0.5
bl97-II	Bulgaria		0.5		0.92		0.46					0.49
bl98-I	Bulgaria	1998	0.5	8	0.92	45.7	0.44	-0.24	0.43	6.06	0.89	0.545
bl98-II	Bulgaria		0.5		0.92		0.44		0.43	6.13	0.89	0.51
bl99-I	Bulgaria	1999	0.5	8	0.92	46.2	0.44			6.14	0.89	0.475
bl99-II	Bulgaria		0.5		0.92		0.44			5.63	0.84	0.48
bl00-I	Bulgaria	2000	0.67	8	0.92	47.3	0.46	-0.04	0.49	5.83	0.86	0.485
bl00-II	Bulgaria		0.67		0.92		0.46		0.49	5.36	0.8	
bl01-I	Bulgaria	2001	0.67	9	0.94	51.9	0.53			6.83	0.94	0.465
bl01-II	Bulgaria		0.67		0.94		0.53			5.82	0.86	0.485
bl02-I	Bulgaria	2002	0.67	9	0.94	57.1	0.6	0.20	0.56	5	0.73	

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bl02-II	Bulgaria		0.67		0.94		0.6		0.56	6.54	0.93	
bl03-I	Bulgaria	2003	0.67	9	0.94	57	0.6	0.11	0.53	6.55	0.93	
bl03-II	Bulgaria		0.67		0.94		0.6		0.53	5.36	0.8	
bl04-I	Bulgaria	2004	0.67	9	0.94	59.2	0.63	0.19	0.56	5.38	0.8	
bl04-II	Bulgaria		0.84		0.94		0.63		0.56	5.13	0.76	
bl05-I	Bulgaria	2005	1	9	0.94	62.3	0.68	0.19	0.56			0.57
bl05-II	Bulgaria		1		0.94		0.68		0.56	6.06	0.89	0.555
bl06-I	Bulgaria	2006	1	9	0.94	64.1	0.7	-0.01	0.5	6.63	0.93	
bl06-II	Bulgaria		1		0.94		0.7		0.5	5	0.73	0.53
bl07-I	Bulgaria	2007	1	9	0.94	62.7	0.68	0.00	0.5	6.14	0.89	
bl07-II	Bulgaria		1		0.94		0.68		0.5	5.83	0.86	
ro92-I	Romania	1992	0.17	5	0.82					5.83		
ro92-II	Romania		0.17		0.82					5.22		
ro93-I	Romania	1993	0.33	5	0.82					6.46		
ro93-II	Romania		0.33		0.82					5.73		
ro94-I	Romania	1994	0.33	5	0.82					6.55		
ro94-II	Romania		0.33		0.82					6		0.555
ro95-I	Romania	1995	0.33	5	0.82	42.9	0.4			4.67		
ro95-II	Romania		0.33		0.82		0.4			5.23		
ro96-I	Romania	1996	0.33	8	0.92	46.2	0.44	-0.51	0.35	6	0.88	0.48
ro96-II	Romania		0.33		0.92		0.44		0.35	5.75	0.85	
ro97-I	Romania	1997	0.33	8	0.92	50.8	0.51			5.75	0.85	0.465
ro97-II	Romania		0.5		0.92		0.51					0.46
ro98-I	Romania	1998	0.5	8	0.92	54.4	0.57	-0.62	0.32	6.06	0.89	0.51
ro98-II	Romania		0.5		0.92		0.57		0.32	6.13	0.89	0.485
ro99-I	Romania	1999	0.5	8	0.92	50.1	0.5			6.14	0.89	0.45
ro99-II	Romania		0.5		0.92		0.5			5.63	0.84	0.455
ro00-I	Romania	2000	0.67	8	0.92	52.1	0.53	-0.43	0.37	5.83	0.86	0.45
ro00-II	Romania		0.67		0.92		0.53		0.37	5.36	0.8	
ro01-I	Romania	2001	0.67	8	0.92	50	0.5			6.83	0.94	0.44
ro01-II	Romania		0.67		0.92		0.5			5.82	0.86	0.465

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ro02-I	Romania	2002	0.67	8	0.92	48.7	0.48	-0.23	0.43	5	0.73	
ro02-II	Romania		0.67		0.92		0.48		0.43	6.54	0.93	
ro03-I	Romania	2003	0.67	8	0.92	50.6	0.51	-0.27	0.42	6.55	0.93	
ro03-II	Romania		0.67		0.92		0.51		0.42	5.36	0.8	
ro04-I	Romania	2004	0.67	9	0.94	50	0.5	-0.17	0.45	5.38	0.8	
ro04-II	Romania		0.84		0.94		0.5		0.45	5.13	0.76	
ro05-I	Romania	2005	1	9	0.94	52.1	0.53	-0.27	0.42			0.515
ro05-II	Romania		1		0.94		0.53		0.42	6.06	0.89	0.505
ro06-I	Romania	2006	1	9	0.94	58.2	0.62	-0.19	0.44	6.63	0.93	
ro06-II	Romania		1		0.94		0.62		0.44	5	0.73	0.475
ro07-I	Romania	2007	1	9	0.94	61.2	0.66	-0.28	0.42	6.14	0.89	
ro07-II	Romania		1		0.94		0.66		0.42	5.83	0.86	
tr96-I	Turkey	1996	0.33	8	0.92	56.7	0.6	-0.01	0.5	5.75	0.85	0.46
tr96-II	Turkey		0.33		0.92		0.6		0.5	4.86	0.7	
tr97-I	Turkey	1997	0.33	7	0.89	60.8	0.66			4.88	0.71	0.435
tr97-II	Turkey		0.33		0.89		0.66					
tr98-I	Turkey	1998	0.33	7	0.89	60.9	0.66	-0.28	0.42	5.75	0.85	
tr98-II	Turkey		0.33		0.89		0.66		0.42	2.33	0.16	
tr99-I	Turkey	1999	0.33	7	0.89	59.2	0.63			4.73	0.67	0.405
tr99-II	Turkey		0.5		0.89		0.63			4.73	0.67	0.415
tr00-I	Turkey	2000	0.5	7	0.89	63.4	0.69	0.02	0.5	5.75	0.85	0.415
tr00-II	Turkey		0.5		0.89		0.69		0.5	4.44	0.61	
tr01-I	Turkey	2001	0.5	7	0.89	60.6	0.65			5.89	0.87	0.41
tr01-II	Turkey		0.5		0.89		0.65			5	0.73	0.44
tr02-I	Turkey	2002	0.5	7	0.89	54.2	0.56	0.04	0.51	4.27	0.57	
tr02-II	Turkey		0.5		0.89		0.56		0.51	3.75	0.44	
tr03-I	Turkey	2003	0.5	7	0.89	51.9	0.53	0.04	0.51	6.11	0.89	
tr03-II	Turkey		0.5		0.89		0.53		0.51	5.38	0.8	
tr04-I	Turkey	2004	0.5	7	0.89	52.8	0.54	0.04	0.51	4.57	0.64	
tr04-II	Turkey		0.5		0.89		0.54		0.51	3.38	0.35	
tr05-I	Turkey	2005	0.5	7	0.89	50.6	0.51	0.16	0.55			0.415

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tr05-II	Turkey		0.67		0.89		0.51		0.55	5.75	0.85	0.38
tr06-I	Turkey	2006	0.67	7	0.89	57	0.6	0.16	0.55	3	0.27	
tr06-II	Turkey		0.67		0.89		0.6		0.55	4.45	0.61	0.345
tr07-I	Turkey	2007	0.67	7	0.89	57.4	0.61	0.29	0.59	4.73	0.67	
tr07-II	Turkey		0.67		0.89		0.61		0.59	5.75	0.85	
tr08-I	Turkey	2008	0.67	7	0.89	59.9	0.64	0.26	0.58	5.67	0.84	0.38
tr08-II	Turkey		0.67		0.89		0.64		0.58	1.78	0.1	
tr09-I	Turkey	2009	0.67	7	0.89	61.6	0.67	0.34	0.6	6	0.88	
tr09-II	Turkey		0.67		0.89		0.67		0.6	5.78	0.86	
tr10-I	Turkey	2010	0.67	7	0.89	63.8	0.7	0.35	0.6	5.73	0.85	
tr10-II	Turkey		0.67		0.89		0.7		0.6	6	0.88	
tr11-I	Turkey	2011	0.67	9	0.94	64.2	0.7			3.6	0.4	
tr11-II	Turkey		0.67		0.94		0.7			4.33	0.58	
tr12-I	Turkey	2012	0.67	9	0.94	62.5	0.68			3.88	0.47	
tr12-II	Turkey		0.67		0.94		0.68					

Note here that we miss data for some years, thus we leave blank in the dataset. For data that are given on a yearly base we gave the same value for both the semesters.