The Europeanisation of candidate countries: the case for a shift to the concept of EU member-state building

Research Article

Davide Denti
PhD candidate, School of International Studies, University of Trento
davide.denti@unitn.it

www.suedosteuropa.uni-graz.at/cse/en/node/46
Contemporary Southeastern Europe 2014, 1(1), 9-32
The Europeanisation of candidate countries: the case for a shift to the concept of EU member-state building

Davide Denti

The research on the impact of the European Union on its candidate countries has been traditionally framed within the concept of Europeanisation. But the term, notwithstanding two decades of usage, still lacks clarity in its attributes and its referent. Moreover, the statehood of candidate countries has emerged as a prerequisite for its effectiveness, providing no answer for cases of limited statehood and limited Europeanisation. The concept of member-state building, which refers to the EU's purpose of building functional member states while integrating them, may help reframe the academic discussion on the impact of the EU on candidate countries, particularly in limited statehood contexts, by complementing it with insights from the literature on state building. Deriving from an understanding of sovereignty as responsibility, member-state building highlights the paradoxes of simultaneous state building and European integration, given their competing logics of sovereignty concentration and sovereignty diffusion. To solve the dilemma, nevertheless, member-state building has one further resource. By exploiting the lack of a single blueprint and the possibility of different solutions for institutions to be compatible with EU requirements, member-state building can also foster domestic ownership and legitimacy, thus evading the trap of imposed international state building.1

Keywords: Europeanisation, state building, member-state building, EU enlargement, candidate country

Introduction
Research on the impact of the European Union on its candidate countries has been traditionally framed in the concept of Europeanisation - the domestic impact of Europe. The concept, which proved particularly useful in describing the spillover effects of integration on the EU member states and their responses, was later applied in the field of EU external relations, first in the occasion of

---

1 Davide Denti is a PhD candidate at the School of International Studies, University of Trento. He holds MAs in International Relations from University of Milan (2008) and in European Studies from the College of Europe, where he served as teaching assistant. His research interests include EU politics and Europeanisation, EU enlargement and the Western Balkans. His PhD project looks at the EU enlargement as a process of construction of member states.

1 An earlier version of this article was presented at the annual conference of the Società Italiana di Scienze Politiche (SISP), Florence, 12-14 September 2013, in the panel on "The transformative power of Europe: EU and Western Balkans after 15 years." I am grateful to the panel’s organisers, Cristina Dallara and Daniela Irrera, as well as to the discussants, Paul Blokker and Lorenzo Cecchi and to the journal’s anonymous reviewers.
the eastern enlargement of the EU in 2004/07, and then also in relation to the European Neighbourhood Policy.

Compatible with both rationalist and constructivist approaches, Europeanisation has been used to describe the two-ways, top-down and bottom-up relation between the European Union and the domestic structures which interacts with it. The result is not necessarily a homogeneous convergence, but rather a differentiated pattern, dependent on several scope conditions.

Europeanisation, notwithstanding two decades of usage, still lacks clarity in its attributes and its referent. The same concept has been used both as a measure of the specific impact of the EU (EU-isation) and of the circulation of broader ‘European’ practices, and referred either to quantitative indicators (adoption and implementation of EU-based laws) or qualitative markers (Europeanisation of identities, attitudes and preferences). Finally, Europeanisation has been embedded in the literature on norms diffusion, and the statehood of candidate countries has emerged as a prerequisite for its effectiveness, providing no answer for cases of limited statehood and limited Europeanisation.

The research agenda on “Europeanisation East”, in particular, has focused on the process of Europeanisation in the framework of the EU enlargement process towards Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The starting positions of those candidate countries, dealing simultaneously with a transition to democracy, market economy, and ‘Europe’, together with their strong power asymmetry towards the EU, has led to a process of Europeanisation that is strictly one-way, top-down, and explained better by rational choices approaches based on incentives and conditionality. On the other hand, in particular in the post-2004 enlargement agenda focused on the Western Balkans, consolidated statehood has emerged as the fundamental prerequisite for Europeanisation, that most states of the region still lack.

To overcome the problems of conceptual overstretch in Europeanisation studies, and the dilemma of Europeanisation in limited statehood contexts, this paper introduces the concept of EU member-state building, with reference to the EU’s purpose of building functional member states while integrating them. Deriving from an understanding of sovereignty as responsibility, the concept of member-state building integrates the literature on Europeanisation with the literature on state building. Member-state building has to face several paradoxes in order to accomplish its aim. State building and European integration are usually dealt with in different moments of time, as they follow the two opposite logics of sovereignty concentration and sovereignty diffusion. The current EU candidate countries, nevertheless, are facing the two processes simultaneously, thus confronting often contradictory impulses.

---

To solve the dilemma, nevertheless, member-state building has one resource more than Europeisation or state building alone: it can refer to the value of diversity and the commitment to its preservation in the European Union. By exploiting the lack of a single blueprint and the possibility for different solutions to be compatible with the broad European standards, member-state building can also foster domestic ownership and legitimacy, thus evading from the trap of imposed “liberal peace” statebuilding. The EU is thus able to act as an “interested moderator”5 “neither a model, nor a hegemon.”6

The first section of the paper introduces the various definitions of the concept of Europeanisation and the different theoretical approaches used to understand its causal mechanisms, taking into consideration the scope conditions that allow Europeanisation to manifest itself. The second section zooms in on the Europeanisation of candidate countries, discussing its open issues. The third section introduces the concept of member-state building as a complement and an alternative to current discussions about the Europeanisation of candidate countries, considering how member-state building allows to better frame the contradictions and challenges that the Western Balkans and the EU face in their integration path.

1. Europeisation: definitions and mechanisms
1.1. Defining Europeisation: exploring the domestic effects of Europe
The research on Europeanisation is part of the shift from an ontological to a post-ontological research agenda in EU studies. Europeanisation research is interested in explaining not what the EU is, but what the EU does, as in its effects on the member states, and their responses to adjustment pressures.7 The definition of Europeanisation has been gradually broadened from an outcome to a process, to include recursive relations.

As an outcome, Europeanisation has been understood as “a situation where distinct modes of European governance have transformed aspects of domestic politics.”8 This result-oriented definition is static rather than dynamic, answering the question of how much something is “europeanised” with reference to a predetermined “European” norm in policies, institutions, or even identities as an end result. Nevertheless, it is problematic in referring to an end point which is difficult to pinpoint, and it loses sight of other possible outcomes than convergence. Alternative definitions have thus focused on Europeanisation as a process, either a top-down or a circular one.9

---

9 The distinction between process-oriented and result-oriented definitions was first put forward in Maniokas, Klaudijus. 2001. Concept of Europeanisation and Its Place in the Theories of the European Integration, Lithuanian Political Science Yearbook.
As a one-way process, Europeanisation has been defined as integrating the supranational and national political levels by “reorienting the direction and shape of politics.”¹⁰ In this way, “domestic policy areas become increasingly subject to European policy-making”,¹¹ while the EU level exerts an influence “impacting member states’ policies and political and administrative structures.”¹² All these first generation definitions stress a top-down relation following an organisational logic, in which domestic institutions adapt to the altered context of EU membership.¹³ When defining Europeanisation as “the ‘domestic impact of Europe’ - the various ways in which institutions, processes and policies emanating from the European level influence policies, politics and polities at the domestic level”, Börzel and Risse treat European-level developments as the explanatory factor of changes at the domestic level.¹⁴ Nevertheless, risks lie in reifying Europeanisation as something out there, able to explain what we see,¹⁵ or in giving it primacy as an independent rather than an intervening variable in ongoing processes of modernisation and globalisation.¹⁶

Finally, a two-ways, process-oriented definition of Europeanisation sees it as a relation of influence between the national and the supranational level which is circular rather than unidirectional, and cyclical rather than one-off. One of the most accurate definitions put forward is the one by Dyson and Goetz, who define Europeanisation as “a complex interactive ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ process in which domestic polities, politics, and public policies are shaped by European integration and in which domestic actors use European integration to shape the domestic arena. It may produce either continuity or change and potentially variable and contingent outcomes.”¹⁷ The pressure from above (structure) interacts with the “creative use” (agency) of European integration by domestic actors,¹⁸ including their attempts at “uploading”¹⁹ and “projecting”²⁰ their own national standards at EU level, and with phenomena of horizontal socialisation and learning. Convergence is not prioritised, but uneven

---

¹⁸ Chatzigagkou, *Enlargement*, 47.
outcomes stem from differences among countries and issue areas, refracting, mitigating and filtering the impact of integration.21 Europeanisation appears both as a cause and an effect of change, blurring the boundaries between independent and dependent variables.22 Though useful to remind of the interrelatedness between Europeanisation and European integration, this definition risks to directly encroach upon the field of the latter and to end up into conceptual overstretch. The three understandings of Europeanisation, captured by the definitions above, are summarised in the table below.

Table 1: Definitions of Europeanisation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Direction of change</th>
<th>Dimensions of Europeanisation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One-way, linear, one-off (top-down)</td>
<td>Static: outcome</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Europeanisation as transition towards a 'Europeanised' endstate</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two-way, circular, cyclical (bottom-up-down)</td>
<td>Dynamic: process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Europeanisation as a circular/cyclical relation between national and supranational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Europeanisation as domestic change coming from 'Europe'</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.2. The three strands of neo-institutionalism and the mechanisms of Europeanisation

Europeanisation research has been mainly framed within neo-institutionalist theories of European integration. Neo-institutionalism argue that institutions structure politics by determining who is able to act and by shaping their strategies and (eventually) their interests, identities, and horizons of action. Three theoretical strands have helped to frame Europeanisation: rational choice, sociological, and historical institutionalism.23

First, rational choice institutionalism, as an agency-centred approach based on methodological individualism, relies on a hard rational choice ontology depicting the actors as dedicated to maximise their utility function according to a logic of consequentiality. Preferences are fixed and exogenous to interaction. Institutions work as opportunity structures, constraining states’ strategic behaviour and solving collective action problems.24 A rational choice reading of Europeanisation sees the EU as yet another resource for domestic actors, leading to their differential empowerment and to a strategy of reinforcement by reward: “a state adopts EU rules if the benefits of EU rewards exceed the domestic adoption costs.”25 Moreover, functional emulation can also indirectly lead to policy competition and lesson drawing: “A state adopts EU rules, if it

---

22 Börzel, Europeanization.
Davide Denti

expects these rules to solve domestic policy problem effectively." The EU *acquis* and accession negotiations make up the context where “reinforcement by reward” works best; technicality allows de-politicisation, while sectoral veto players are kept at bay by the aggregate benefit of membership.26

A critique to this rational choice approach has come from the perspective of post-positivist social science (*Verstehen*), interested more in understanding the meaning of the actors’ behaviour than in explaining or predicting it through mechanistic reasoning based on if-then causality chains typical of positivist natural science (*Erklären*). In fact, it is doubtful whether agency and subjectivity can be externally objectivised and analysed as if they were natural forces acting in causally linear ways, while both the agents and the researcher are involved in a complex web of human interactions.28 Thus, following the lesson of Droysen, Dilthey and Simmel on hermeneutics, a more interpretive understanding has been offered by sociological institutionalism. This approach posits a social ontology where agents and structure are mutually constituted, “claiming that there are properties of structures and of agents that cannot be collapsed into each other.”29 Immersed in a normative environment, actors first adopt and then internalise social prescriptions in the form of norms, i.e., “set[s] of shared intersubjective understandings that make behavioural claims” upon them.30 Preferences and identities are endogenous to the process of interaction. Individuals behave trying to “do the right thing” through a logic of appropriateness, i.e., “rule-guided behaviour.”31 The EU is considered by sociological institutionalists as “the formal organization of a European international community defined by a specific collective identity and a specific set of common values and norms.”32 Indirectly, even in absence of EU impulse, normative emulation may result in the mimicry of models with higher perceived legitimacy.33

Thirdly, historical institutionalism is an eclectic approach relying on the sequencing of the previous two.34 In the short-term, institutions are only behavioural constraints for actors’ strategies of utility maximisation, but “in the long-run, actors’ very identities may be powerfully shaped by institutional arrangements.”35 Historical institutionalism sees institutions as sticky structures that lock in actors into persistent patterns. Change is explained by institutional misfit and external shocks, punctuating the equilibrium and resettling it on a new course. Policy inertia and path dependency limit EU influence, and only

26 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, *Governance*, 668.
27 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, *Governance*, 671-73.
28 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this insight.
32 Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, *Governance*, 667.
marginal change can be expected by layering or patching up. Though combining the previous two approaches, historical institutionalism remains somehow biased towards structure. The three strands of neo-institutionalism are summarised in the table below.

Table 2: Europeanisation according to the three strands of neo-institutionalism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Rational choice institutionalism</th>
<th>Sociological institutionalism</th>
<th>Historical institutionalism</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Logic of action</td>
<td>Consequentiality</td>
<td>Appropriateness</td>
<td>Path dependency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(cost-benefit analysis)</td>
<td>(rule-guided behaviour)</td>
<td>(stickiness of institutions)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interests of the actors</td>
<td>Exogenous to interaction</td>
<td>Endogenous to interaction</td>
<td>Evolving over time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(new means for old goals)</td>
<td>(new means for new goals)</td>
<td>(malleable in the long-term)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main element of change</td>
<td>Thin learning</td>
<td>Thick learning</td>
<td>Timing and practices</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(strategic bargaining)</td>
<td>(socialisation)</td>
<td>(punctuated equilibrium)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy of Europeanisation</td>
<td>Conditionality</td>
<td>Persuasion and legitimacy</td>
<td>Incremental change</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(reinforcement by reward)</td>
<td></td>
<td>and critical junctures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direct influence</td>
<td>Cost/benefit manipulation</td>
<td>Normative pressure</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(incentives/disincentives,</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>capacity-building)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect influence</td>
<td>Functional emulation:</td>
<td>Normative emulation</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- regulatory competition</td>
<td></td>
<td>(mimicry)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- lesson-drawing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope conditions</td>
<td>1. Credibility</td>
<td>1. Norms legitimacy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2. Determinacy</td>
<td>2. Identification with EU</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3. Adjustment costs</td>
<td>3. Norm resonance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4. Size/speed of reward</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5. Number of veto players</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contexts of main relevance</td>
<td>Acquis conditionality:</td>
<td>Democratic conditionality:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Accession negotiations</td>
<td>- Association negotiations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Finally, domestic actors are not simply passive recipients of Europeanisation. Instead, it is their active engaging, interpreting, incorporating or resisting to external influence that shapes the outcomes, resulting in convergence or divergence. Four scopes conditions for institutional change were identified by Börzel and Risse. They include the need for a domestic demand for change, the presence of statehood and institutional and administrative capacities, the type of domestic regime and its resonance with EU norms, and power asymmetries strengthening the EU’s leverage. The final resulting framework of Europeanisation can be depicted as in table 3 below.

---

Table 3: Europeanisation framework: logics of action, scope conditions, outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Influence modes</th>
<th>Logics of action</th>
<th>Scope conditions</th>
<th>Outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct</td>
<td>Coercion, authority</td>
<td>Domestic Demand</td>
<td>Inertia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consequentiality</td>
<td>Statehood</td>
<td>Absorption</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indirect</td>
<td>Appropriateness</td>
<td>Regime type</td>
<td>Transformation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Path dependency</td>
<td>Power Asymmetries</td>
<td>Retrenchment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2. **Europeanisation beyond the member states and its pitfalls**

During the 1990s, the growing influence of the EU on Central and Eastern European countries (CEE) in the frame of its enlargement policy led Europeanisation scholars to widen their field of research.\(^{38}\) This section zooms in on Europeanisation beyond the member states, highlighting the main features of “Europeanisation East” and identifying four main open issues: unclear conceptual boundaries, a return to first generation top-down definitions, the risks of degreeism and adjectivised Europeanisation, and the seemingly intractable issue of stateness for contested candidate states.

2.1. **Europeanisation vs. EU-isation: lack of clear conceptual boundaries**

The concept of Europeanisation, first, is subject to a terminological ambiguity. The term does not include a clear specification of the source of change expected at domestic level. We need to know “which Europe we are talking about.”\(^{39}\)

In a minimalist sense, Europeanisation is understood as “the process of downloading EU directives, regulations and institutional structures” to the national level.\(^{40}\) “Minimally, ‘Europeanization’ involves a response to the policies of the European Union.”\(^{41}\) This narrow, EU-centric sense, which could be better termed ‘EU-isation’,\(^{42}\) is the one that scholars usually refer to in rationalist approaches, as it is easier to operationalise and to test empirically.

In a maximalist sense, on the other hand, one can “speak of Europeanisation when something in the domestic political system is affected by something European”,\(^{43}\) i.e., it is “a phenomenon exhibiting similar attributes to those that predominate in, or are closely identified with, ‘Europe’.”\(^{44}\) Such an approach

---

\(^{38}\) Sedelmeier, *Europeanisation*, 5.
\(^{44}\) Featherstone, *Introduction*, 3.
The Europeanisation of candidate countries opens up to the possibility of voluntary, indirect mechanisms resulting in institutional isomorphism or mimicry, and includes the possibility of a broader understanding of “Europe”, taking into consideration the role of other European international organisations, global institutions and the broad “cultural Europe” in the circulation of norms, practices and behaviours, as in the framing of the Eastern Enlargement as a part of the historical process of “return to Europe” of countries which felt having been violently separated from it.45

In fact, while the second, maximalist meaning seems the most linguistically appropriate for the concept of Europeanisation, for the sake of familiarity and operationalisation most scholars use the first, minimalist sense. This is an even more contentious issue when the Europeanisation of candidate states is at stake, since the EU may be acting in parallel with pressures from other organisations, as the Council of Europe or NATO, in addition to the broader globalisation and modernisation trends.

2.2. Europeanisation East in the shadow of hierarchy: back to a top-down definition?
The research agenda on the Europeanisation of candidate countries developed from the studies on conditionality in the EU’s eastern enlargement process. It was possible to speak of Europeanisation of candidate countries, striking a parallel with internal EU dynamics, due to the broad scope of the process, covering the whole of the *acquis*, and to the extent with which EU institutions steered it.46

According to Héritier, the main differences between “Europeanisation West” (Europeanisation within the EU) and “Europeanisation East” (Europeanisation of candidate countries) lay in the starting situation of CEE countries, featuring both a triple simultaneous transition (to democracy, market economy, and sometimes also statehood) and a strong linkage with EU accession negotiations. In such a setting, the “overpowering external incentives associated with EU membership conditionality” exert an “enormous pressure” on candidate states.47 When coupled with the wide scope of accession negotiations, including all the issues areas covered by the *acquis* and even beyond in cases of democratic conditionality, the frequent demands for wholesale institutional reform, and the extensive monitoring role of the European Commission on implementation, membership conditionality leads Europeanisation East to conform more with first-generation definitions of Europeanisation as a one-way, top-down process. Candidate countries are denied agency in the process, as they have no outlet to express their voice or to shape the policies of which they are at the receiving end.

Both types of Europeanisation share the key empirical finding of a differential impact of “Europe” across countries and issue areas. Nevertheless, given its peculiarities, Europeanisation East has highlighted a more clear-cut explana-

tory value of rational institutionalist hypotheses for the domestic impact of the EU, when compared with sociological and historical institutionalist alternatives. Clear and credible incentives underpinning conditionality, in terms of both rewards and punishments, and the political costs incurred by domestic elites, seem able to explain the variance in the outcome levels of Europeanisation. As such, the Europeanisation of candidate countries looks like a hierarchical process of conditional compliance.

2.3. Adjectivised Europeanisation: the dangers of degreeism
As underlined by Sartori, a concept is defined in its field of application by two properties in a trade-off relation, intention and extension. The more the properties a concept includes (intention), the less the empirical realities to which it will apply (extension). Radaelli noticed earlier on that Europeanisation studies seemed to privilege extension, covering a broad range of different phenomena, and attributed it to the early stage of the research field. Similarly, the definition that he put forward back then was also highly denotive, intending to seize the research object by putting forward a catalogue of elements that may fall within its field of application, even if they do not appear at first sight to have many properties in common. In Sartori’s language, Radaelli’s definition could be classified as a “precising denotive” definition.

The assumption was that, after a first exploratory approach to the field, more intention-focused definitions and approaches would have resulted in a deeper understanding. In fact, more than one decade later, Europeanisation studies keep using the same denotive and extensive definitions. The result is conceptual stretching in terms of degreeism, as differences in degree replace differences in kind. By not being able to define what Europeanisation is and what is not, observers tend to see it everywhere, but only partially. As Radaelli contended, “if everything is Europeanized to a certain degree, what is not Europeanized?” The result can be seen in the rising trend of ‘adjectivised Europeanisation’ studies, arguing that Europeanisation is there, but only to a certain extent, by referring to “limited”, “slow”, “shallow”, “sluggish”, or “negoti-

---

48 Sedelmeier, Europeanisation, 7.
50 Radaelli, Whither Europeanization, 5.
51 “Processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and (c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies.” See: Radaelli, Europeanization, 30.
53 Chatzigiagkou, Enlargement, 45.
54 Radaelli, Whither Europeanization.
56 Radaelli, Whither Europeanization, 6.
The Europeanisation of candidate countries

ated”61 Europeanisation. While these labels are often used descriptively, sometimes they are held up as new concepts. In fact, they risk mistaking a difference in the outcome (differential, limited convergence and compliance) with a difference in the process. Instead of defining the scope conditions of the process of Europeanisation in the context of candidate countries, in order to explain its differential outcome, the process itself is tweaked.

2.4. The issue of stateness: a cul-de-sac for weak states in the enlargement process?
Concerning the Europeanisation of candidate countries, one scope condition appears to be particularly well-suited to explain variance in outcomes: statehood (or stateness). As underlined by Fukuyama, “before you can have a democracy or economic development, you have to have a state.”62 Differently than in previous EU enlargement rounds, in the Western Balkans different types of states coexists, ranging from international semi-protectorates to more or less consolidated states. The contestation of the polity, together with the weakness and vulnerability of state structures, which Linz and Stepan had already put at the centre of the explanatory model of post-communist transition,63 have also been singled out as an intervenient variable in Europeanisation processes: “deficient patterns of compliance tend to correlate well with the problem of stateness.”64

The same argument is endorsed by Börzel, when she states that “limited statehood is the main impediment for the Western Balkans on their road to Brussels”, since it “affects both the capacity and the willingness of countries to conform to the EU’s expectations for domestic change.”65 In fact, limitations in both sovereignty (the domestically and internationally uncontested claim to the legitimate monopoly of force) and capacities (organisational, financial and cognitive resources to make and enforce collectively-binding rules) “have seriously curbed the transformative power of the EU in the Western Balkans - despite their membership perspective.”66 In contexts of contested statehood, conditionality is not able to produce social learning and modify behaviours, and state weakness leads the EU to behave inconsistently, reducing its own leverage and the effectiveness of conditionality.

61 Chatzigagkou, Enlargement.
67 Börzel, When Europeanization, 173.
Consolidated statehood is crucial to make Europeanisation work. Uncontested sovereignty and sufficient state capacity are indispensable to comply with EU expectations for domestic change. For countries that lack one or both, membership is too remote to provide sizeable and credible incentives to engage in costly reforms.\textsuperscript{67}

This finding leads to a dilemma in the EU enlargement policy: the EU has offered future membership as a contribution to soften and solve statehood issues, but those very issues are undermining the Western Balkans’ compliance with EU norms and rules. According to Börzel, “the EU is unlikely to deploy much transformative power in its neighbourhood as long as it does not adjust its ‘accession tool box’ to countries whose statehood is seriously limited.”\textsuperscript{68} The EU appears ill-equipped, to Börzel, to deal with weak statehood cases, as it has no previous experience as a state-builder, and the case of Kosovo demonstrates that it has not developed the policies to become one. Its conditionality, capacity-building and selective coercive powers seem insufficient to produce anything more than formal, superficial change. Moreover, the EU’s post-modern emphasis on power-sharing and minority rights clashes with state-building attempts to create strong central institutions and national identities. “Somewhat paradoxically, the EU can neither empower liberal reform coalitions where they do not exist, nor can it build states where there is no consensus on the national unit.”\textsuperscript{69}

Börzel’s ultimate finding is that the EU “lacks a clear strategy for state-building”, but she does not suggest the EU to equip itself with one (as “it is no use trying to develop one”),\textsuperscript{70} advocating instead that the EU acknowledges that it can only promote stability in its neighbourhood, and not substantial change. While this seems reasonable in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy, it should be not necessarily so for the countries included in the enlargement agenda. The next section puts forward a new approach to the dilemma, by reframing it in terms of member-state building, in order to look for new solutions.

3. A clearer referent: the case for the use of the concept of member-state building

An alternative approach - or better a complementary one - to Europeanisation in the context of EU candidate countries is the concept of “member-state building.” Initially employed quite denotatively, the use of this concept is growing in the literature and its features are becoming clearer. This section introduces the theoretical referents of member-state building in the literature on state building and the notion of sovereignty as responsibility. It then defines it and traces the early discussions on the topic, concluding with identifying the insights that member-state building can provide about how to solve the dilemma of simultaneous state building and European integration.

\textsuperscript{67} Börzel, When Europeanization, 183.
\textsuperscript{68} Börzel, When Europeanization, 174.
\textsuperscript{69} Börzel, When Europeanization, 183.
\textsuperscript{70} Börzel, When Europeanization, 184.
3.1. From international state building to member-state building
The issue of statehood, essential for Europeanisation but not addressed by it, has been usually tackled by the literature on international state building, focused on “expanding over time the autonomy, authority, legitimacy and capacity of the state.” Under the assumption that state weakness or failure is at the root of conflict, international state building has developed since the 1990s as a strategic approach to sustainable peace. Premised on the incapacity of domestic state consolidation, external intervention is considered necessary, geared towards “the creation of new institutions and the strengthening of old ones.”

Two different approaches to state building can be discerned in the literature: a structure-centred approach focusing on institutions, and an agency-centred approach focusing on legitimacy. The mainstream approach to state building, based on a Weberian conception of the state, keeps this latter conceptually distinct from society and equates weak statehood with lack of institutional capacity. State building is thus defined as the creation and strengthening of new governmental institutions, consistently with a liberal peace-building approach arguing that democracy, economic interdependence, and international organisation are conducive to peace. It nevertheless fails in devising an adequate notion of legitimacy without falling in a circular definition of legitimacy as belief in legitimacy-a by-product of successful institutions.

To the contrary, the critical literature on international state building has pointed to the lack of legitimacy of models of state building designed and imposed from abroad. Institutional state building has been criticised as a discourse that produces states that are “failed by design”, by underplaying the role of local agency and reinforcing political dependency from abroad. An alternative approach to state building and legitimacy, reinstating an element of agency, has thus been developed by these scholars by taking into account the relation of mutual constitutiveness between state and society and the possibility to analyse it using constructivist theoretical tools. State failure and collapse is also deemed to derive from the collapse of the central authority’s legitimacy and of its capacity to command loyalty, adding “a layer of complexity by looking

---

at the nation-state as a constitutive whole" and drawing attention to the role of the “local” element and the agency of the beneficiaries of state building in hybridising the outcome.

3.2. Sovereignty as responsibility and the making of responsible (minimalist?) states

Member-state building, as a concept, relates directly to the literature concerned with “liberal peace” and post-liberal international state building, which in turn refer to a notion of sovereignty as responsibility. In contrast to the traditional meaning of sovereignty, couched in terms of absolute independence and autonomy, sovereignty as responsibility underlines its role in the socialisation of states. Sovereignty “no longer appears to be an on-or-off condition”, rather than a natural right of states, sovereignty is constructed as a concession, a privilege dependent on the fulfilment of certain responsibilities. In this way, sovereign governments are subject to both domestic and international accountability; they are less “free agents” and more “members of one community.”

Taking a Foucauldian perspective, Aalberts and Werner remark how “state sovereignty is used as a governmental technology that aims to create proactive, responsible subjects.” Starting with the Islands of Palmas arbitration, and up to the 2001 final report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), sovereignty is being increasingly understood as an obligation to respect the rights of other states, shaping and fostering autonomous and responsible members of the international society, “constituting states as capable actors that bear responsibility for their policy choices.”

The practice of international state building derives from an understanding of sovereignty as responsibility. Under the assumption that state weakness or failure is at the root of conflict, and premised on the incapacity of domestic state consolidation, state building aims at reconstructing state structures through external intervention. Intervention may be either direct, or through coercion and monitoring, or by conditionality, in a ‘long-distance’ state building approach. The shift towards the latter is due to the incompatibility of long-term

---

80 Lemay-Hébert, Rethinking Weberian Approaches, 11.
82 Fukuyama, Stateness, 88.
86 Aalberts and Werner, Mobilising Uncertainty, 2198; This understanding nevertheless does not go uncontested. On the one hand, it appears to undermine political agency and the accountability of power, see Cunliffe, Philip. 2007. Sovereignty and the Politics of Responsibility, in Politics Without Sovereignty. A Critique of Contemporary International Relations, edited by Bickerton, Christopher J. / Cunliffe, Philip and Alex Gourevitch. New York: UCL Press, 40. On the other hand, it seems to serve well to an “Empire in denial”, when one considers that power, in the post-ideological era, is exercised to escape and avoid responsibility, see Chandler, Empire, 30.
The Europeanisation of candidate countries
direct intervention with democracy and the rule of law, and to its legitimacy and commitment crisis.87

The state that tends to emerge from international state building, anyway, has some typical features: according to Zaum, it is an executive-dominated state, still unable to provide most public services, and often reproducing pre-war patterns of political economy.88 Bieber coins for it the term of minimalist state, i.e., “an effort to address the sources of conflict and state weakness by fostering state structures which fall short of the set of functions most states are widely expected to carry out, but by doing so might be able to endure.”89 The minimalist state is a sub-type of the weak state, but it holds minimal functions and has only minimal ambitions. Its legitimacy is still contested, both domestically and often internationally; its capacity to enforce decisions is weakened by power-sharing agreements and veto points; and its scope (the fields with which its structures engage) may be limited to few central functions: defence, foreign affairs, monetary policy. Nevertheless, its very limitation may allow it to sustain itself.90

3.3. Member-state building: building functional states while integrating them

Member-state building was first referred to as a strategy in the 2005 report by the International Commission on the Balkans (ICB), “The Balkans in Europe’s future.”91 Member-state building was supposed to face the “integration challenge” and respond to the ghettoisation of the remainder of the Balkans, once Romania, Bulgaria and Croatia would have joined the Union. The ICB recognised that Western Europe and the post-Yugoslav states were “talking at cross-purposes” in the 1990s.92 The EU was set on the course of a post-modern project of supranational integration, while the newly independent states were in a state- and nation-building moment which led only to the creation of weak states and protectorates. “Building functional member states while integrating them into the EU is Brussels unique challenge in the Balkans.”93 Member-state building was seen as a distinct strategy from both international state building and the EU enlargement process: “The objective is not simply to build stable, legitimate states whose own citizens will seek to strengthen and not destroy them - rather it is the establishment of a state that the EU can accept as a full member with absolute confidence.”94

The same year as the ICB’s report, the European Stability Initiative (ESI) distinguished in the Western Balkans three models of state building. The first, traditional capacity-building, focuses on standard non-coercive developmental

tools to foster democracy and institution-building, as applied in many other locations worldwide. The second, authoritarian state-building, aims at fostering institutional development by entrusting wide-ranging competences to international structures, unaccountable in the domestic constitutional sphere. Such powers, meant to respond to threats to public order and ensure minority protection in post-conflict scenarios, were “reasonably successful” in achieving Fukuyama’s first stage of nation building - the material and institutional reconstruction of the countries at stake.\(^95\) Nevertheless, they faced open issues in passing to its second stage - the creation of an effective state, able to respond to the challenges it faces. The national administrations were still too weak to even describe such issues (see the lack of censuses in Bosnia and Kosovo), before being able to set a strategy and enact it.

The third, EU-peculiar approach was named member-state building and when applied to candidates for EU membership “accomplished revolutionary transformations over the past decade” in CEE and Turkey,\(^96\) outnumbering the success stories of the first two approaches. Member-state building, according to the ESI, is made up of three processes. First, “an administrative revolution”, brought about by alignment to the EU acquis, in terms of institutions and legislation. Second, “a process of social and economic convergence”, aiming at cohesion and fostered by regional and rural development policies, increasingly implemented through national multi-year programming and certified by the Commission. And third, “a shift in the substance and processes of democratic governance”, opening up the decision-making process to consultation with the civil society, due to the effect of the first two elements.\(^97\)

### 3.4. The paradoxes of member-state building and the role of the EU

Later studies defined EU member states building as “a specific path to EU membership creating, in parallel, the preconditions for being a sustainable State as well as a future Member State.”\(^98\) The EU enacts a dual strategy, of state building and of European integration, towards the states in its enlargement agenda, through the tool of conditionality:

> The intricate process of EU integration with all its norms, procedures and criteria is the best crash-course in rational state management, good governance and administrative capacity building ever. The added value is in the form rather than the content of the EU integration process.\(^99\)

> The challenge for the region is no longer about peacebuilding but about a process of preparation for membership in European structures [...] Democratization and state building are fundamental elements of this Europeaniza-

---


\(^96\) ESI, *Breaking out*, 3.

\(^97\) ESI, *Breaking out*, 6-8.

\(^98\) Woelk, *EU Member State-Building*, 470.

The Europeanisation of candidate countries

The EU, in other words, is building states which can eventually join the Union.  

Nevertheless, as much as Europeanisation is weakened by the lack of statehood, member-state building shows all the contradictions of the EU’s effort to build states while integrating them. A third generation of critical Europeanisation studies needs to tackle the issue of the contradictions of the EU strategy, and the factors weakening its transformative power.

The EU has been unable to transfer conditionality to state-building; stateness has remained the biggest obstacle to EU integration. Europeanisation-Southeast, to paraphrase Héritier, has been mostly externally-driven, coercive and increasingly demanding. The main contradiction arises from the tensions between building minimal states (the post-conflict state building agenda) and building future EU member states (the member-state building agenda). In fact, there exists a complex and non-linear relation between European integration and stateness. On the one hand, integration requires from states to renounce to absolute competence and pool some sectoral sovereignty in order to achieve common solutions. On the other hand, the EU requires from them high capacity requirements, in order to transpose EU law into domestic legislation, and to take part in common decision making. This is at odds with the conditions of most post-conflict states, which feel a need for strong, symbolic external sovereignty, while facing challenges of limited domestic capacity.

EU member-state building in the Western Balkans has come to encroach on open issues of sovereignty. Conditionality itself has sometimes undermined state building, by the little leverage of “sliced out” conditions, the cross-conditionality with other international organisations, and the absence of a single EU member-state model. The EU acquis is “weak on the nature of the state [...] The EU gives little guidance as to what kind of states can join the EU.”

In this context, “success” in member-state building, according to Bieber, corresponds to exiting the minimalist state category, by acquiring legitimacy, strength and scope, “to be able to function as a future EU member state, and to provide services to citizens that allow them to secure popular legitimacy.” Meeting the high expectations of both society and the EU is proving challenging for state institutions; “the bar for state success in the Western Balkans is considerably higher than in other regions.”

Woelk identifies five paradoxes of member-state building. The first is the “paradox of sovereignty”: Western Balkans states, while they see the mirage of ab-

---

103 Bieber, Building Impossible States, 1785.
104 Bieber, Building Impossible States, 1793-94.
105 Bieber, Building Impossible States, 1798.
106 Bieber, Building Impossible States, 1799.
solute sovereignty, are subject to international pressures to limit their sovereignty even before full integration. The second is the “no blueprint paradox”: the region, as well as the EU, shows remarkable diversity in the forms and functions of state structures, not providing any clear constitutional model. The third is the “good will paradox”: the EU lacks effective means of enforcement, especially in case of violation of political and constitutional duties, as a reflex of the voluntary nature of integration. The fourth is the “no damage paradox”: sanctions, as a way of enforcing decisions, might often even worsen the situation, thus suggesting a more strategic use of positive incentives instead. Finally, the “mirror paradox” tells us that “the EU’s capacity of acting as a catalyst for reforms depends very much on its own attractiveness.”

The main question about the EU’s role concerns “how to find solutions for sustainable change and create incentives for overcoming these paradoxes.” According to Woelk, the point of reference is that diversity is worth being preserved, as it is recognised by the EU as a value in itself (art. 4.2 TEU). Therefore, the sovereignty paradox and the no-blueprint paradox seem to dispel the idea of a grand road map, a “detailed construction plan” for member-state building. Rather, the EU should shift its discourse and practice from “European standards” to “European adaptations”, in order to take into consideration the diversity among candidates and among member states. By taking as a reference point the shared values and principles of democracy, human rights, and rule of law, operationalised in particular by other organisation (Council of Europe, OSCE), the EU could spell out a set of different compatible options, from which the candidates could legitimately decide which to adopt according to local needs and features. This would help overcome the sovereignty paradox, as well as fostering “local ownership” by citizens and political elites.

The EU, in the context of member-state building, would thus assume the role of an “interested moderator”, suggesting different perspectives and aiming to improve the political debate and decision making processes. The concept is similar to Balibar’s idea of a “vanishing mediator”: the EU would employ a relational power in its conflict management strategy, highlighting “the constitution of a community sharing a similar fate (and thus not necessarily a similar identity as such).” By recognising conflict as a constitutive of the political, Balibar too points to the ability of the EU to preserve diversity, thus working as “neither a model, nor a hegemon.” This may also help depoliticising the issue of EU integration, which has often become a divisive theme in candidate countries, as “the creation of a general consensus on EU integration is of fundamental importance in the process of EU Member-state building.”

What are thus the necessary features for a working member-state building approach? Woelk underlines the need for an incentive-based perspective of pos-

---

It is evident that the need for legitimate institutions, to acknowledge the political nature of state building, and to prioritise peace building as its foundation.

The ability of the EU member-state building approach to soften the contradiction of “liberal peace” international state building may be illustrated with an example from the enlargement process, the police reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In a case of mismanaged conditionality, in 2004 the Office of the High Representative/European Union Special Representative (OHR/EUSR) Paddy Ashdown identified police reform as a key prerequisite for progress in the European integration path of the country. However, early apparent inter-ethnic agreement on the issue soon disappeared, leading Bosnia to the deepest political crisis since post-war democracy. Ashdown’s centralisation effort, cast in technocratic terms of judicial reforms, was undermined by the lack of common standards, either in the EU or by the Council of Europe, on police matters. The evident lack of legitimacy of the EU conditions raised opposition by local politicians. The impasse remained until the OHR/EUSR backpedalled, accepting cosmetic changes as satisfactory. In this case, it is apparent how the lack of respect for the value of diversity, intrinsic in the international state-building agenda allowed domestic actors to oppose a veto and conquer the agenda of reform. A different approach, based on member-state building, could have presented Bosnian politicians with several possible solutions for compatibility between Bosnian institutions and broad European standards, drawing options from the experiences of various EU member states. In this way, open domestic discussion on the model to adopt would have also added legitimacy to the process, avoiding the democratic contradictions of imposed models.

A change in this direction is evident in recent practice from the EU’s previous vertical and hierarchical positioning at the helm of international protectorates (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo) towards a more horizontal and deliberative approach based on new political partnership instruments (High Level Accession Dialogues, HLAD) aimed at fostering ownership and legitimacy in low-statehood candidate countries. The EU is thus trying to be less of an “Empire in denial” or a “substitute for Empire”, and work together with local elites in fostering state building in a way that is compatible with both the European member-state model and domestic democratic procedures.

More could still be done; Farrell has gone as far as to call upon the EU to facilitate a locally-driven agreement to reform the Dayton Constitution of Bosnia-Herzegovina to make it compatible with EU accession and put an end to the

114 Woelk, EU Member State-Building, 477-79.
115 Juncos, Member State-Building.
117 Chandler, Empire.
international presence in the country.\textsuperscript{119} This could be the final challenge for EU member-state building; after the several failed attempts at reforming Dayton, the EU would have to be extremely careful, though, in fostering a local solution from within, without imposing it from outside, for both legitimacy and effectiveness concerns.

Conclusions
This article has reviewed two approaches to the relation between the European Union and the candidate and potential candidate countries which are now part of its enlargement agenda, the countries of the Western Balkans and Turkey. The first one makes use of the concept of Europeanisation, coming from neo-institutionalist theories of European integration. But the lack of consolidated statehood is undermining the very mechanisms of Europeanisation, which has proved unable to transfer conditionality to state building. The literature has thus seen the growth of studies on ‘adjectivised Europeanisation’, with a looming risk of degreeism.

A second approach, complementary to Europeanisation, derives from the literature on state building, particularly its legitimacy-focused approaches. Member-state building, intended as “building functional member states while integrating them into the EU”\textsuperscript{120}, faces the same competing logics of sovereignty concentration and sovereignty diffusion as Europeanisation, but allows more ways out of the dilemma. Besides the traditional capacity-building approach of state building, member-state building allows the EU to refer to its value of diversity preservation. By exploiting the lack of a single blueprint and the possibility for different solutions to be compatible with the broad European standards, member-state building can also foster domestic ownership and legitimacy, thus supporting local democracy rather than hindering it. The role of the European Union in its candidate countries emerges as the one of an “interested moderator”,\textsuperscript{121} “neither a model, nor a hegemon.”\textsuperscript{122}

Overall, making enlargement work is fundamental for the future shape of the relations between the EU and its neighbours, and for the identity of the Union itself. As recalled by Krastev, “the real choice the EU is facing in the Balkans is: enlargement or Empire.”\textsuperscript{123} Member-state building can be a useful analytical tool to understand the challenges of enlargement, and look for new solutions to seemingly intractable dilemmas.

Bibliography

\textsuperscript{120} ICB, The Balkans, 29.
\textsuperscript{121} Woelk, EU Member State-Building, 477.
\textsuperscript{122} Ramel, The Role of the European Union.
\textsuperscript{123} ICB, The Balkans, 11.


